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MEDICAL ADVOCATES: A CALL FOR A NEW PROFESSION
MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN*

Health care cost containment has spawned a number of changes in the
health care system with potentially dire consequences for individual
patients. Patients need professional help to protect their interests. This
help is best provided by a new, multi-disciplinary group of health care
professionals whose job is to be advocates for their patient clients.
One of the most profound changes in the history of the American
health care system is the emergence of managed care as the method of
choice for controlling health care spending. Managed care can take a
number of forms. One form is when the provider of health care services,
whether a health professional like a physician or a provider institution
like a hospital, is paid on a capitated basis, that is, paid a set amount each
month1 for each person who may receive services. The less the provider
spends on the patient, the greater the proportion of the capitated amount
the provider gets to keep as profit. The process by which the provider
monitors and attempts to limit the services it provides is a form of selfmanaged care.
A second form of managed care stems from financial incentives that
third-party payers, such as employers or health insurance plans, give feefor-service providers to limit services. Here, the providers are paid on a
fee-for-service rather than on a capitated basis. 2 But the third-party payer
rewards the provider financially for holding down the volume of services.
A common type of such an incentive program is to withhold a portion of
the provider's fee and refund it to the provider at the end of the year if
the provider has remained within utilization guidelines established by the
payer. This form of managed care often includes a "gatekeeper" feature.
The "gatekeeper" feature gives financial incentives to a primary care
physician who has the responsibility to decide what additional services the
patient will receive, including, for example, whether the patient will be
referred to a specialist or admitted to a hospital.

* Arthur F. Petersilge Professor of Law and Director, The Law-Medicine Center,
Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Lori Wald
Friedberg for stimulating his latent ideas on the subject, Melissa Dosick for her research
help, and Jean Carter for help in preparing the manuscript.
1. The payment period need not be a month, but may be semi-annually, annually,
or any other calendar period.
2. In other words, providers receive a separate fee for each service or unit of service

(such as a day of hospitalization) they provide.

Widener Law Symposium Journal

[Vol. 1:299

Managed care also includes a broad range of other efforts to influence
resource allocation decisions made by health care professionals. Many of
these approaches are embraced within the term "utilization review." This
encompasses requirements that the professional obtain permission from
the third party payer' either before a service is rendered ("prospective
utilization review"), or before the payer will pay for a service that already
has been provided ("retrospective utilization review"). Prospective
utilization review is often employed when a primary care physician wishes
to refer a patient to a specialist. If the third-party payer decides that a
referral is not necessary, it will refuse authorization. If the primary care
physician nevertheless believes that a specialist's services are medically
necessary and initiates the reference, the physician may be penalized and
the patient is usually required to pay for the specialist's care out-of-pocket.
Utilization review also covers more subtle forms of pressure to limit
services. For example, a managed care organization (MCO) may provide
a physician with data comparing his service patterns with those of other
providers or with pre-established guidelines. The MCO may notify the
physician or hospital that a utilization guideline is about to be or has been
exceeded. As its ultimate weapon, an MCO may exclude from
membership a health care provider who does not limit services. If the
physician is excluded from a group of physicians or hospitals that has a
special arrangement to provide services to a large group of people, such as
enrollees in a large health insurance plan or the employees of a large
company, then such an exclusion may result in a serious or even fatal
blow to the physician's practice.4
All of these managed care approaches have one thing in common: they
all aim to reduce services to patients in order to reduce costs. Cost
savings translate into greater profits for capitated providers, greater savings

3. Sometimes the party that must give the okay to the professional is not the thirdparty payer itself but a provider organization, such as a hospital or group practice. The
third-party payer pays on a capitated basis or on a fee-for-service basis with financial
incentives to limit services.
4. One form of exclusion is for a hospital to withdraw admitting privileges from
a physician because the physician is not providing enough financial benefit to the hospital.
Perhaps the physician is furnishing expensive patient services for which the hospital
receives a capitated payment. This practice is called "economic credentialing," withdrawing
the physician's admitting privileges, and generally has been upheld by the courts. See John
D. Blum, Evaluation of Medical Staff Using Fiscal Factors: Economic Credentialing,26 J.
HEALTH & HOSP. L. 65, 68 (1993) (citing Rosenblum v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional
Medical Ctr., No. 91-589 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1992), as the first reported pure economic
credentialing decision).
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for employers with self-insured plans, and more net revenue for traditional
insurance plans that retain the difference between premiums received and
the cost of services.
If managed care, in general, threatens patients with the denial of
medically needed services, one type of MCO, the "for-profits," present the
greatest risk. Unlike not-for-profit entities, which can exist by breaking
even, for-profit companies must pay dividends or increase the value of
their shares in order to remain economically viable. Beholden to
shareholders and dependent on equity markets for their capital, for-profits
are forced to be far more entrepreneurial than their non-profit
counterparts; their gaze is drawn perforce more to the short-term bottom
line than to long-range or eleemosynary objectives.
Advocates of managed care might disagree that the primary aim of
managed care is to reduce services. They might assert that the objective
is to provide services, such as preventive care, which reduce the need for
more expensive care later on. The advocates would insist that no rational
managed care provider would deny patient care knowing that this would
increase downstream costs.
Studies on managed care do provide some support for these claims.
There is no question that HMO enrollees receive more preventive care
than enrollees in traditional health insurance plans.5 Moreover, if
managed care providers skimped significantly on necessary services, one
would expect to see a deterioration of quality. However, studies generally
show that HMO patients receive care of the same or better quality than
other patients.6
However, these findings must be viewed with caution. For one thing,
it is too soon to expect clear evidence that managed care entities curtail
access to beneficial medical services. The medical system is still filled with
waste, in the form of unproven or non-beneficial interventions. The
system also maintains a sufficiently large margin of safety, within which
managed care providers can reduce costs substantially without significantly
compromising the overall quality of patient care.7 However, this cannot

5. Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan PerformanceSince 1980:
A LiteratureAnalysis, 271 JAMA 1512, 1516 (1994).
6. Id.
7. Id. However, this does not mean that the quality of care from managed care
providers is adequate in all cases. Quality comparisons between managed care and
traditional providers are based on aggregated data from a large number of patients. Id.
See George N. Peters, Organizationaland Business Issues Affecting Integrated Delivery
Systems, 20 TOPICS IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING 1, 13 (1994). Individual patients may
stil suffer from poor quality care.
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go on forever. Eventually, competitive pressures, particularly in the forprofit sector, are bound to force managed care providers to save money
by withholding interventions with established patient benefits. These
same pressures will make it difficult for managed care providers to
continue spending money up-front in order to save money in the long
run. For example, providers may forego more costly forms of preventive
care or early treatments. Start-up companies will need to establish a
foothold in the market. Older entities may attempt to expand their
market share. They will do so by cutting short-term costs at the expense
of long-term savings. These pressures will be magnified in the case of forprofit providers whose investors will demand short-term profitability.
Moreover, it is important to note that the incentive to provide
preventive services disappears once prevention has failed and the enrollee
becomes ill. Even if managed care providers are willing to make shortterm expenditures to reduce long-term costs, they still have an incentive
to withhold services from enrollees who become chronically or seriously
ill and require extensive, costly care.
The threat to patient interests posed by MCOs, specifically for-profit
entities, is exacerbated by another recent development in the health care
industry: the growth of integrated delivery systems. Like managed care,
the term "integrated delivery system" encompasses a wide variety of health
care providers. Basically, the term refers to the coalescing of two or more
individual provider entities into a single system. The objective is to
increase the market power of the resulting entity, enabling it to compete
more effectively. But the impact on health care consumers is to reduce
the number of provider options from which they have to choose.
Integration into large provider organizations also tends to insulate these
providers from susceptibility to consumer pressures that might be asserted
by individuals or small groups of patients.
In addition to the growth of managed care, for-profit medicine and

8. Peters explains that:
An integrated delivery system . . .is any organization, or group of affiliated
organizations, that provides physician and hospital services to patients. More
sophisticated systems provide additional services, such as home health, hospice,
skilled nursing, preventive medicine, mental health, rehabilitation, and long-term
care. The goal is to offer a full continuum of care.
Id.
The latest form of integration is "virtual integration," where provider organizations
combine contractually and electronically rather than forming one formal or physically
distinct entity. See Jeff Goldsmith, It's Time for Virtual Integration, HOSP. & HEALTH
NETWORKS, Apr., 1995, at 11.
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integrated delivery systems, further developments impacting individual
patient interests are severity-adjusted outcome measurement and the
concomitant shift toward aggregate quality measures. Previously, efforts
to improve the quality of health care focused on the care received by
individual patients in specific cases. These cases would be reviewed by
hospital medical staff tissue committees, Medicare Peer Review
Organizations (PROs), and in some cases, the courts. Since every patient
complaint potentially could trigger an investigation, the fate of individual
patients was important. Now, quality assurance efforts are aimed at
detecting patterns and practices over time. What happens to an individual
patient directly relates to a provider's performance trend. Regulatory
actions, such as those taken by PROs, are triggered mainly by downward
trends in quality.9 Health care provider institutions, such as hospitals and
HMOs, are eager to find out whether patients are satisfied with the care
they receive. However, the views of individual patients are amalgamated
into statistical profiles on individual practitioners and organizations. At
the same time, so-called "malpractice reforms" reduce the ability of
individual patients to obtain damages for substandard care. 10
The combined effect of these developments is to submerge the interests
of individual patients and to subordinate them to the interests of the
group, whether it be a group of managers, insureds, or shareholders.
Patients face increasingly large and powerful provider/payer bureaucracies.
These organizations are motivated by competitive pressures to earn profits
by reducing costs. If necessary, they withhold beneficial services,
particularly from patients who are seriously or chronically ill. These
individuals are lost in a system of quality measurement approaches that
focus on the experiences of large numbers of persons. Malpractice victims
are being stripped of their traditional legal remedies.
These developments also have positive effects. Aggregated quality
assurance approaches may be more constructive and less threatening to

9. Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare Program, Peer Review
Organizations: Revised Scopes of Work, 57 Fed. Reg. 26,871 - 872 (1992). This move is
reflected, for example, by the change in focus of the Medicare PRO's from individual
episodes of care to the performance of providers over time and in comparison with similar
providers. Id. at 26,873. For a thorough discussion of this new approach, see INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR
QUALITY ASSURANCE (1992).

10. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, IMPACT OF
LEGAL REFORMS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS 50 (1993) ("[M]ost of the reforms

implemented to date ... have focused on limiting suits, and hence, have not attempted to
increase injured parties' access to fair compensation.").
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health care professionals. Providers receive feedback identifying deviations
from practice patterns, rather than specific instances of wrong doing.
Malpractice reform may reduce malpractice premiums" and defensive
medicine."
Integrating delivery systems may decrease hospital
overcapacity and technological redundancy, such as, the proliferation of
diagnostic imaging devices in a single health care market. 3 To the extent
that persons enrolled in health insurance plans pay all or part of their
premiums directly," cost saving techniques may lower premiums or limit

premium increases."
Yet, even if managed care produced these benefits, they are not shared
equally by all parties. Holding health insurance premiums down by
reducing services may be good for payers, and even for healthy medical
plan enrollees, but not for those who need the services because they are
ill.'6 When a patient is denied health care in the interests of a broader
group, the distribution of benefits and burdens between the patient and
the group is highly disproportionate. Keeping health insurance premiums
11. Id. at 2.
12. See generally Id.
13. Joan Mazzolini & Dave Davis, Doctors Dodge State Rules to Cash in False
Information Provided to Get Lucrative Equipment, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 13, 1994, at 1A.
The Cleveland metropolitan area, at last count, had at least 14 diagnostic imaging devices.
Id.
14. Enrollees pay health insurance premiums indirectly when their employers
provide coverage in lieu of other benefits, such as higher wages.
15. However, there is little accurate data demonstrating this. See Miller & Luft, supra
note 5, at 1515 (explaining that there are no peer reviewed studies adjusted for enrollee and
plan characteristics, such as age and health status).
16. This insurance phenomenon can be demonstrated by a simple example. Suppose
that a health plan has 1000 enrollees and that enrollees absorb the costs of premium
increases equally, either directly by being self-insured, or indirectly if health insurance is
an employment benefit that reduces other benefits such as wages. Suppose that patient A
needs health care service X, a service that costs $100,000 and provides a comparable
amount of health benefits. A cost-conscious provider who did not provide X would save
each enrollee, including patient A, $100 in premiums. But patient A has been denied
$100,000 worth of health benefit, for a net loss of $99,900. From A's standpoint as an
enrollee, the decision to deny X may seem correct, but from A's standpoint as a patient
in need of X, it would not be advantageous."
Of course, patient A might be met with the objection: What if all enrollees would
benefit by receiving health service X? If each enrollee received it, each person's premiums
would increase by $100,000. But insurance plans are based on underwriting principles that
assume that: (1) not every enrollee will consume expensive services, and (2) the premiums
from healthy enrollees will be available to subsidize the health care expenses of those who
are ill. This dramatizes the conflict of interest between healthy and sick enrollees.
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down by denying treatment may benefit the patient, especially if she pays
all or part of her premiums, but that benefit is spread pro-rata across all
members of the health plan. The health consequences of treatment denial,
however, are borne principally by the patient (and her family and friends).
This is the inverse of moral hazard, which is the tendency for insured
individuals to demand greater insured services because the costs are spread
across the pool of insureds. In the case of moral hazard, the individual
benefits by imposing costs upon the group. In managed care, the group
benefits by imposing costs upon the individual. Since the individual in
question is often an isolated, seriously, or chronically ill patient, the
inverted form of moral hazard that characterizes managed care might be
called "immoral hazard."
The interests of payers, along with those of healthy and sick enrollees
in managed care, in short, are in conflict. For those patients who need
expensive or long-term services, the conflict may be so severe that the
managed care system becomes adversarial.
Adversarial relationships in health care are nothing new. Consider the
interaction between malpractice plaintiffs and defendants, between
physicians and disciplinary boards, or between hospitals and accrediting
bodies. But managed care creates a new adversarial relationship: between
the health care system and the patient.
Under traditional fee-for-service medicine, patients and providers were
allies rather than adversaries. The more beneficial services patients
received, the more providers were paid. Payers had an interest in holding
down costs, but generally subordinated themselves to the interests of
patients. Payers deferred to providers' judgments about what services
were medically necessary."'
On the other hand, under managed care, payers have aligned their
interests with providers and healthy insurance plan enrollees. Patients are
on the other side, particularly those who are seriously or chronically ill.
As managed care proliferates and becomes more sophisticated, seriously ill
patients face increasingly large, integrated, for-profit, managed-care
Managed care gives payers and healthier enrollees
organizations.
numerous mechanisms to promote their interests in reducing costs. The
bureaucratic power wielded by these organizations can easily overwhelm
the average person, let alone a person who is ill and vulnerable.
The plight of patients in managed care settings raises two important
issues. First: what are patients entitled to? Justice requires that these
patients not be abandoned. They deserve to be protected against having
17. See Breedon v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 734, 737 (M.D. La. 1974) (explaining
that Medicare is required to pay for services deemed medically necessary by the physician).
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their interests rejected in favor of the interests of managed care payers and
healthy enrollee majorities. But what are they owed? This is an
extremely difficult question and answering it is beyond the scope of this
article."8 Instead, this article focuses on a second major question raised
by managed care: whatever individual services patients in managed care
environments are entitled to, how are they going to obtain what they are
due? In short, how will their rights be protected?
I. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF PATIENT PROTECTION

Clearly, patients need help coping with the threat of underservice from
managed care providers. Where might this help come from? One source
is the law. Laws could be passed at the state or federal level halting the
formation of the threatening health care organizations. For example,
legislatures could prohibit health care organizations from combining

insurance and provider functions. In short, they could ban HMOs and
similar entities. But this would be politically unrealistic. Health policy

18. The traditional answer might be that patients are owed what their health
insurance contract says they are owed, or, in the case of a patient insured by the
government, what the laws and regulations provide. But this is a far too simplistic
response. Neither insurance contracts, nor rules governing government entitlement
programs, have been clear or unequivocal enough to escape being interpreted by the
courts. Courts have been willing to invalidate provisions of contracts between patients
and health care providers on the ground that the patients lacked adequate bargaining
power to obtain a fair deal. See, e.g., Tatham v. Hoke, 469 F. Supp. 914 (W.D.N.C. 1979);
Madden v. Kaiser, 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976); Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d
441 (Cal. 1963); Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976);
Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 282 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1981); Meiman v. Rehabilitation Ctr.,
444 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1969); Spencer v. West 126 S.2d 423 (La. Ct. App. 1960); Abromowitz
v. New York Univ. Dental Ctr., 494 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Leidy v.
Deseret Enters., Inc., 381 A.2d 164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429
(Tenn. 1977); Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth. v. Price, No. 614, 1988 WL
27230 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1988). States have mandated that insurers cover certain
services whether or not they chose to include them voluntarily in their contracts. See, e.g.,
GA.CODE ANN. 5 33-29-3.3 (1995) (mandating insurance coverage for bone marrow
transplants for the treatment of breast cancer); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, S 764c (1992)
(providing coverage for mammographic exams); WASH. REV. CODE S 5419 (1995)
(mandating insurance coverage for adopted children under the same terms as natural
children of the insured). Arguably, as managed care entities become more powerful
compared with individual patients, the law will have to play an even greater role in
defining patients' substantive rights.

1996]

MedicalAdvocates

experts are counting too much on managed care providers to solve the
problem of rising health care spending. Even if the laws were passed,
entrepreneurs would figure out ways around them.
Another approach might be to more rigorously enforce the antitrust
laws, so that MCOs would remain relatively small and with limited
market power. This might reduce their ability to behave in a high-handed
manner with patients. However, even small MCOs would be formidable
bureaucratic adversaries for individual patients.
If the formation of powerful MCOs is inevitable, a better approach
might be to use the law to regulate the methods by which they operate.
For example, the law could ban financial incentives that rewarded
physicians for withholding care. This actually has occurred at the federal
level: The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA)
prohibited hospitals and prepaid health care organizations from knowingly
making incentive payments to a physician as an inducement to reduce or
limit services to Medicare or Medicaid patients.19 However, we cannot
ignore political and economic realities: The laws pertaining to HMOs have
never been put into effect.2"
More importantly, these laws do not prohibit powerful pressures that
health care organizations can assert to limit services, such as prospective
and retrospective utilization review and economic credentialling of
physicians. Even if laws aimed at these practices were adopted, they
would be difficult to enforce. These practices are far too deeply integrated
into the fabric of health care decision-making to be removed completely.
It is hard to imagine a regulatory technique that would ably distinguish
between objectionable utilization review (the kind that denied patients
beneficial care to which they were entitled), and utilization controls aimed
at avoiding nonbeneficial or harmful medical interventions. Additionally,
there are many indirect means which limit access to health care services,
such as administrative roadblocks and delays in obtaining appointments
that are not easily amenable to regulatory oversight. Even if regulatory
structures were put in place, limitations on government regulatory
resources are likely to steer focus attention on patterns of misconduct
rather than on individual cases. Regulators eventually might sanction or
disqualify a health care organization for repeatedly denying services to
patients, but these efforts would be of little help to the actual patients
whose previous difficulties led to this result.
19. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, S 9313(c), 100
Stat. 1874, 2003 (1986).
20. Implementing regulations has been proposed but not finalized. See 57 Fed. Reg.
59024 (proposed Dec. 14, 1992).
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Another legal approach might be holding managed care entities liable
for tort damages if they denied enrollees necessary medical services. 2'
However, courts have recognized a number of limitations on this type of
liability. For one thing, many managed care entities are exempt from
liability under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).22
These managed care providers are only obligated to provide enrollees with
the services covered under the applicable health insurance contract. 23 At
the same time, health insurers are becoming more adept at incorporating
dear coverage limitations into their insurance contracts, and courts seem
to be becoming less willing to construe ambiguous language in favor of
enrollees.24 Changes in the law to facilitate managed care liability would

21. While the managed care entity might also be violating its contractual obligations
to enrollees, the measure of contractual damages, generally recovery of the cost of
obtaining services elsewhere, is markedly inadequate to compensate victims. Moreover,
contract violations might be difficult to prove. See infra note 22 (listing cases and
respective tort theories against qualified health plans).
22. 29 U.S.C. S 1001 etseq. (1995). The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) exempts qualified health plans, and those who administer them, from
state law, including state tort remedies for malpractice. Id. See Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l
Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 694
(1994); Corcoranv. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.denied, 113
S. Ct. 812 (1992); Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61 (D. Conn. 1990);
Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D.C. NJ. 1994); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316
(D. NJ. 1993); Nealy v. United States Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y.
1994). Only a few cases have recognized a cause of action for enrollees who claim that
they were denied reasonable care by qualified health plans. See Independence HMO Inc.,
733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that ERISA did not preempt defendant's state
tort claim); Decker v. Saini, No. 88-361768 NH, 1991 WL 277590 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1991)
(holding that plaintiff's claim against the HMO was supported by the theory of ostensible
agency); Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995) (finding the HMO liable on the theories
of vicarious liability and corporate negligence).
23. Non-ERISA health insurance plans may be required by state law to cover specific
services, such as mental health and substance abuse treatments. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, S 768 (1978) (mandating payment for psychological services). See also supra note
17. Some health reform interest groups, including state governments, have pressured
Congress to modify the ERISA exemption for employer health care plans, but so far, to
no avail. See Marilyn Werber Seratini, Up Against ERISA, 6 NAT'L J. 349 (1995); Janice
Somerville, Reform Battle Turns to ERISA but Changes Under Debate, 38 AM. MED. NEWS
3 (1995).
24. See, e.g., Grethe v. Trustmark, 881 F. Supp. 1160 (N.D. 11. 1995); Bechtold v.
Physicians Health Plan, 19 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1994); Hendricks v. Central Reserve, 39 F.3d
507 (4th Cir. 1994) (enrollee did not meet the burden of proof showing insurance contract
entitled her to new cancer treatment).
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be helpful, but may not occur.
If patients cannot rely solely on the law to protect them, where else can
they turn? Over the years, commentators have proposed numerous
suggestions. One of the oddest recommendations was that insureds should
rely on their employers or their insurers for protection. For example,
Richard Epstein once wrote that "HMO's [sic]... can negotiate master
contracts with employers or unions that represent the consumer's interest
and need not bear the cost of educating or negotiating with individual
patients."' Perhaps this is a plausible suggestion when the perceived
threat to patients is powerful providers who charge unreasonably high
prices. But as discussed in Part I, in the new managed care enviromnent,
the power, and consequently the threat to patients, has shifted from health
care providers to health care payers. Under these circumstances,
entrusting the welfare of individual patients to the very payers who
threaten them would be a blatant case of the proverbial fox guarding the
hen house.
A more enduring and potentially effective means of protecting patients
is the ombudsperson. Typically, this is someone appointed by the
government to receive, investigate and help resolve patient complaints.
Ombudspersons have been used extensively for residents of nursing
homes.2 6
Recently, some state governments have established
ombudsperson programs for HMOs that enroll Medicaid recipients."
One commentator suggested that ombudsperson programs be incorporated
in President Clinton's health reform proposal to watch for plans that
attempted to deny services that were supposed to be part of their basic
benefits package.28
Ombudsperson programs can provide important assistance to
patients. 29 However, an ombudsperson program that provided effective

25. Richard Epstein, Medical Malpractice,Imperfect Information, and the Contractual
Foundationfor Medical Service, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201, 210 (1986). See also Clark
Havighurst, Competition in Health Services: Overview, Issues and Answers, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 1117, 1133 (1981) (explaining that "[m]ost consumers are now grouped in ways that
allow them to obtain expert assistance in choosing insurance packages. .. ").
26. See Lack of State Action Hampers Efforts of Ombudsmen, 7 BROWN U. LONGTERM CARE QUALITY LETTER 1 (1995) [hereinafter Lack of State Action].
27. See Louise G. Trubeck, Making Managed Competition a SocialArena:Strategiesfor
Action, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 284 (1994) (describing Wisconsin HMO ombudsman).
28. Rand E. Rosenblatt, Equality,Entitlement, and NationalHealth CareReform: The
Challenge of Managed Competition and Managed Care, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (1994).
29. See, e.g., Ralph L. Cherry, Agents of Nursing Home Quality of Care: Ombudsmen
and StaffRatios Revisited,31 GERONTOLOGIST302, 307 (1991) (explaining that ombudsman
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individual assistance to all patients has flaws. One drawback would be the
huge expense of such a program. The legal services program, for example,
costs around $536 million a year,3° and it is reserved for low income
individuals. To keep costs down, patient ombudspersons similarly might
be limited to providing protection for the poor. Some other source of
protection would then be required for middle and upper income
individuals.
Additionally, a government ombudsperson program poses a conflict of
interest. Ombudspersons work for the government and the combined
federal and state government is the single largest health care payer in the
nation. Thus, government ombudspersons would face a conflict of
interest between ensuring that patients received all necessary services and
keeping costs down to the extent that they served patients who were the
beneficiaries of government health care programs.31 Methods would have
to be devised to insulate the ombudsperson from these cost containment
pressures, such as appointing them for life, similar to federal judges. Even
then, they may have trouble owing their entire allegiance to individual
patients. At best, ombudspersons are a partial solution to the problem.
So far, we have considered patient protection approaches that rely one
way or another upon the government. However, reliance on government
is unfashionable. Now, the emphasis is on self-reliance. Patients are
repeatedly being urged to protect their interests themselves. "Choose your
physician or health plan wisely," they are told. According to this
consumerism approach, patients should arm themselves with information,
often obtaining it from the health plans or providers themselves, and
make informed, self-interested choices. If patients are not satisfied, they
should complain first to their physician, next to the provider organization
with which the physician is affiliated, and then to their health plan. If
they are still not satisfied, patients should unleash their ultimate weapon:

programs, but not volunteer programs, are frequently associated with less poor care);
Ombudsman May Be Factor Associated with Quality, 3 BROWN U. LONG-TERM CARE
QUALITY LETTER 5 (1991); Lori Owen & Michael R. Schuster, Legal Support to Long-Term
Care Ombudsman Programs: Seven Years Later, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 617 (1994)
(stating that ombudsman programs can provide important legal support to nursing home
patients). However, an ombudsman program that was too lax might give a false
impression that the interests of individual patients were being upheld.
30. Personal Communication from James Lamb, Communications Director, Legal
Services Corporation (Feb. 10, 1995).
31. See Lack of State Action, supra note 26, at 4 (the fact that ombudsmen are state
employees creates a conflict of interest).
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they should switch doctors, provider organizations, or plans.12
Some patients may be able to hold their own in the new managed care
environment. Everyone has heard at least one story about the feisty
patient who does not take "no" for an answer and eventually succeeds in
getting her health insurance plan to cover a longer hospital stay, adequate
home health care, or an expensive test or treatment. For most patients,
however, this is not a role that they are willing or able to perform.
Expecting the average patient to fend for herself is at best naive. At
worst, it is a duplicitous effort to shift attention away from more effective
patient protection tools.
In the first place, patients lack relevant information, and it is not easy
for them to get it.33 Many of them do not have the time or strength to
pursue information, even when some of it is forthcoming from their
physicians. This is particularly likely to be true of the patients identified
earlier as especially vulnerable in managed care settings: those who are
seriously or chronically ill.
But there is an even more fundamental reason why patient
consumerism is not sufficient: even if they had the necessary information,
patients increasingly lack the power to act on it. In part, this is a
reflection of the vulnerability created by their medical condition. Patients
are often frightened, in pain, and highly dependent upon their health care
provider for comfort and support. But more importantly, patients are
losing their chief weapon: the ability to change their physicians, provider
organizations, or health insurance plans if they are dissatisfied. Insurers
will not cover pre-existing conditions; therefore, patients who switch
insurers would find themselves without coverage for the medical problem
that caused them to seek health services in the first place. The need to
retain existing insurance coverage prevents people from switching jobs, so

32. Kathryn S. Taylor, Shoppingfor Surgery: Consumers Want to Talk Outcomes and
Have A Say In Their Health Care Decisions, 67 HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS 42 (1993).
See also Bruce C. Vladeck, The Consumer Information Strategy in Health CareReform, 272
JAMA 196 (1994) (explaining that "[i]nformed consumer choice is a cardinal principal in
health system reform."); Consumers Union, How To Be a Smart Medical Consumer,
CONSUMER REP., Feb. 1995, at 86 (describing ways for patients to play a more
collaborative role); Lancd Luciano, How to Size Up a DoctorNetwork, MONEY MAG., July,
1993, at 110; Julia Martin, The New Way to Take Charge of Your Health Care, MCCALL'S,
Nov., 1993, at 48 (discussing a patient's option to seek more than one opinion); Patient,
Heal Thyself, THE ECONOMIST, Feb., 1995, at 19 (encouraging individuals to take a more
"intelligent, self-guided approach").
33. SeeMaxwell J. Mehliman, FiduciaryContracting:Limitationson BargainingBetween
Patientsand Health Care Providers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 374-88 (1990).
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even if they did not like the insurance their employers offered them, they
would have little alternative.
Even if legislatures enacted insurance reforms that prohibited exclusions
for pre-existing conditions,34 patients in many instances would still lack
a significant choice of plans. Employees are being given fewer and fewer
choices of plans by their employers. E. Haavi Morreim reports that 84
percent of employers offer employees only one health insurance plan
option. 35 Furthermore, as managed care proliferates, health plan
enrollees are facing more and more limits on the physicians and provider
networks from which they can obtain health care without incurring
significant financial penalties. Meanwhile, the formation of integrated
health care systems is limiting the number of physician groups and
networks with which plans can contract. This results in locking patients
into jobs, which locks them into plans, which lock them into provider
organizations which are becoming fewer and fewer. Patients no longer
have the ability to "vote with their feet," if they ever did. 36
Make no mistake: patients need to look out for themselves as much as
possible. They should become as informed, as involved in fulfilling their
health care needs, and as skeptical as possible. But they also need to look
elsewhere for help. They need allies to assist them in protecting their
own interests in managed care environments. Who might these allies be?
If individual patients cannot represent their own interests adequately,
perhaps they can join patient advocacy groups, such as disease-oriented
patient organizations, 7 or organizations that represent certain

34. See Reform Proposals: Sen. Jeffords Outlines Plan for National Reinsurance
Corporation,Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 745 (May 8, 1995) (describing a
proposal under which employees cannot be denied coverage for preexisting conditions);
Legislation: IncrementalChanges May be Addressed in Budget Bill with Medicare,Medicaid,
Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 698 (May 1, 1995) (describing insurance reforms
that would limit insurers' ability to deny coverage of pre-existing conditions).
35. E. Haavi Morreim, Diverse and PerverseIncentives of Managed Care: Bringing
Patients Into Alignment, 1 WID. L. SYMP: J. 89 (1996).
36. Expecting patients to switch providers during the course of treatment is
particularly unrealistic for those who are seriously or chronically ill. It also goes against
the desire to promote continuous, long-term relationships between patients and providers.
See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Allan S. Brett, Managed Competition and the Patient-

Physician Relationship, 329 New ENG. J. MED. 879, 880 (1993) (discussing "continuity of
care"); David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Physician-PatientRelationship, 5
HEALTH MATRIX 141, 143 (1995) (discussing "the importance of the continuity in the
patient-physician relationship").
37. See, e.g., Dick Thompson, Your Money or Their Lives: Patients Groups Seeking
Better Supportfor Rare Medical Diseases, TIME, Oct., 1992, at 66 (describing older groups
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demographic groups, such as the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP). These groups may be forceful advocates for their constituencies
as a whole, but they are unlikely to have the resources to serve as
advocates for individual members. For example, the AARP, has operated
offices to provide assistance to Medicare beneficiaries. However, these
have been staffed by volunteers and have served primarily as information
clearinghouses, providing brochures about Medicare services and
instructions on how to pursue claims and grievances.38
Even if patient advocacy groups had the resources, it is still not clear
that they would be motivated to represent individual patient interests
adequately. Groups tend to have the interests of the group at heart, not
the interests of individual members. Sometimes individual interests can
be furthered without sacrificing the interests of the group. But this is not
always the case. For example, an individual can demand so large a
proportion of group resources, such as time, money, or expertise, that
there is not enough left for others. In health care, moreover, patient
advocacy groups may feel obliged to compromise the interests of an
individual patient in order to ensure that enough health care resources
remain available for the rest of the group. The advocacy group is also
bound to have its own agenda.39
The tendency of organizations to represent group interests rather than
individual interests reveals the limits of Mark Rodwin's excellent
suggestion that managed care organizations be required to include patient
representatives on its governing boards.40 Patient representation is
helpful to ensure that managed care entities keep the needs of patient
groups as a whole in mind, but patient representatives are unlikely to have
either the willingness or the power to press individual cases.
While individual patients may not find adequate support from patient
advocacy groups, this does not mean that they must act alone. For one
thing, they often have families. Perhaps families can intercede for patients
when they are being underserved. 4' But some patients do not have

such as the Muscular Dystrophy Association, the March of Dimes, the AIDS lobby, the
American Cancer Society, and the Jerry Lewis telethon for Muscular Dystrophy).
38. See AARP, AARP IN ACTION 8-13 (1995).
39. This concept is portrayed well in the film Lorenzo's Oil, where a patient
advocacy group is unwilling to jeopardize its research program in order to accommodate
the needs of one family. LORENZO'S OIL (Universal City Studios, Inc. 1992).
40. Marc A. Rodwin, The Elusive Questfor AccountableHealth Care, 1 WID. L. SYMP.
J. 65 (1996).
41. See Lucy Rose Fischer & Nancy N. Eustis, DRGs andFamily Careforthe Elderly:
A Case Study, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 383, 386 (1988) (explaining that the Medicare
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family members who are actively involved with their care. Even if the
family is involved, the family is no more likely than the patient herself to
possess the time or energy, let alone the information and expertise, to take
on a managed care bureaucracy. Even if a patient were lucky enough to
have a physician, nurse, or health care administrator for a son or daughter,
the interests of the family rather than those of the patient often determine
what happens.
Patients, therefore, must be able to find allies outside their families.
The obvious place to look is within the health care professions themselves.
The patient's traditional ally, of course, was the physician. Physicians
were expected to represent the interests of their patients exclusively. This
is still the position of organized medicine, as indicated by the ethical
guidelines of the American Medical Association, which state:
A physician has a duty to do all that he can for the benefit of his
individual patient. To expect a physician when treating a patient to make
rationing decisions based on government or other external priorities in the
allocation of scarce health resources creates an undesirable conflict with the
primary responsibility of the physician to his patient....
Physicians as citizens have a responsibility to participate and to
contribute their professional expertise in decisions made at the societal level
regarding the allocation or rationing of health resources."
The physicians' duty to look after the interests of their patients as
individuals is also enshrined in the law. After all, loyalty to the patient
is the essence of the physician's role as a fiduciary for the patient.43 As
I have argued elsewhere, this enables the patient to devote resources to
purchasing health care that otherwise would be spent in monitoring
physician trustworthiness."
This duty is reinforced in cases like
Wickline45 and Wilson.46

Diagnostic Related Grouping (DRG) system has resulted in a larger role in hospital care
for families of elderly patients).
42. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, Am. MEDICAL ASS'N, CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS S 2.03 (1992).
43. See Maxwell J. Mehlman & Susan R. Massey, The Patient.PhysicianRelationship
and the Allocation of Scare Resources: A Law and Economics Approach, 4 KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS J. 291 (1994); Mehlman, supra note 33.
44. See sources cited supra note 18.
45. Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that third party
payers of health care may be held liable when medically inappropriate decisions result
from defects in design or implementation of cost containment programs).
46. Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 211 Cal. Rptr. 876 (2d Cir. 1990) (following
Wickline in an implication of liability to third party payor).
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The trends in health care described above, however, are undercutting
the fiduciary nature of the patient-provider relationship. Instead of being
allied with the patient, the physician increasingly is becoming allied with
the third-party payer. In fact, the ultimate goal of managed care may be
to make the provider and the payer a single entity.'
As a result, patients can no longer rely on physicians to represent their
interests exclusively. The financial incentives and other pressures under
managed care place physicians in a conflict of interest between their duties
to their patients and their own self-interest. In Wickline48 and Wilson,49
the courts seem to expect physicians to go to heroic lengths to take on
managed care organizations in order to benefit their patients. These
expectations are becoming increasingly unrealistic. How many physicians
can continue to battle recalcitrant health plans on behalf of a patient when
this would cause them to be dropped from the network and its allimportant source of patients? How many physicians would go even
farther and, if necessary, pay themselves for what they deemed to be
necessary care for the patient, as the physician defendant in the Wickline
case claimed he was willing to do?
One potential solution to the growing pressures on physicians to
sacrifice patient interests to the interests of managed care organizations is
for the law to place counter-pressure on physicians to protect patients.
For example, the physician's fiduciary obligation to the patient could be
strictly interpreted so that a physician who succumbed to managed care
pressures to the patient's detriment would be liable for breach of fiduciary
duty.50 Or, the courts could hold physicians to a universal standard of
reasonable care that downplayed the service limits that managed care plans
imposed. Physicians who injured patients by failing to adhere to that
standard of care would be liable for malpractice. Whatever the source of
physician liability, if the costs to the physician of sacrificing the patient's
interests were made large enough, they might be able to override the
incentives created by managed care to deny services.

47. The ultimate expression of managed care is capitated payment of providers,
which transforms them into insurers and hence, into payers.
48. 211 Cal. Rptr. 876 (2nd Cir. 1990).
49. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (2nd Cir. 1986).
50. The physician may be liable for punitive as well as actual damages in this case.
See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1991) (stating that "if
disloyalty is actually proved rather than inferred, it may be appropriate for fiduciary law
to increase the sanction to include punishment, not just disgorgement of the appropriated
asset.").
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In the end, however, this strategy would depend on judges to strictly
uphold physician duties to patients. It is increasingly doubtful that the
courts would be willing to play this aggressive role on behalf of patients.
Despite the emotional allure of the identifiable courtroom victim, many
judges may feel that the physician has no choice but to follow the dictates
of the managed care entity, and that it is unfair to expect the physician to
act otherwise.51 Still other judges may agree with the utilitarian behavior
of managed care organizations in the face of perceived health care resource
constraints. And if the courts did begin to come down harder on
physicians, relief may be supplied by state legislatures. For example, the
state of Oregon developed a system to induce providers to continue
delivering services in the face of these conflicts. The Oregon legislature has
granted immunity to physicians who fail to provide Medicaid patients
with medically necessary services because the state has refused to pay for
them.5 2 In short, the law seems as likely to relieve physicians of their
fiduciary obligations to their patients as to enforce them.
The same result is likely to be true of efforts to bolster patient
protection through the malpractice laws. A physician (as well as the

51. One judge described his predicament in deciding that a managed care patient did
not prove that she was entitled to a potentially life-saving treatment:
Despite rumors to the contrary, those who wear judicial robes are human beings,
and as persons, are inspired and motivated by compassion as anyone would be.
Consequently, we often must remind ourselves that in our official capacities, we
have authority only to issue rulings within the narrow parameters of the law and
the facts before us. The temptation to go about, doing good where we see fit, and
to make things less difficult for those who come before us, regardless of the law, is
strong. But the law, without which judges are nothing, abjures such unlicensed
formulation of unauthorized social policy by the judiciary. Plaintiff . . . well
deserves, and in a perfect world would be entitled to, all known medical treatments
to control the horrid disease from which she suffers. In ruling as this court must,
no personal satisfaction is taken, but that the law was followed. The court will
have to live with the haunting thought that [the plaintiff], and perhaps others
insured by the Mutual of Omaha Companies under similar plans, may not
ultimately receive the treatment they need and deserve.
Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., No. 92-1089-C, 1992 WL 421489, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Aug.
26, 1992), affid, 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993), cited with approval in Bechtold v. Physicians
Health Plan, 19 F.3d 322, 325 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994).
52. See OR. REV. STAT. S 414.745 (1992) ( "[A]ny health care provider or plan
contracting to provide services to the eligible population under [this Act] shall not be
subject to criminal prosecution, civil liability or professional disciplinary action for failing
to provide a service which the Legislative Assembly has not funded ... ").
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managed care organization itself)5 3 may be liable for malpractice if the
patient is unreasonably denied necessary services. After all, this was the
gravamen of the complaint in the Wickline"4 case. However, a number
of commentators urge courts to permit physicians to assert resource
limitations as a defense, including limitations stemming from restrictions
on coverage resulting from plan coverage exclusions and utilization review
decisions.5 5 Moreover, as these commentators recognize, the medical
profession itself may be able to thwart these lawsuits by redefining the
standard of care to accommodate managed care restrictions. For example,
the medical community can create practice guidelines sensitive to the
pressures physicians face within managed care settings. Malpractice
victims who are poor and unemployed may be unable to find lawyers
willing to take their cases because of the relatively lower value of their
claims.5 Congress and state legislatures seem intent on enacting so-called
malpractice reforms that would reduce the victim's ability to sue or the
damages that the victim could collect. This is hardly the direction to
take if the objective is to intensify legal pressures on physicians to protect
patient welfare.
Some commentators have advocated a middle ground between patient
self-reliance and physician protection of patients. Taking their cue from
the way that the law resolves conflicts of interest in certain other
situations," they propose that patients can protect themselves if
physicians are required to disclose their conflict of interest to patients,
along with any efforts by managed care entities to deny patients needed
care.59 According to this approach, one of the worst managed care

53. See supra note 21.
54. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (2nd Cir. 1986) (holding that third-party payers of health care
may be held liable when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in design
or implementation of cost containment programs).
55. See, e.g., supra note 17.
56. See Helen R. Burstin et al., Do the Poor Sue More? A Case-Control Study of
MalpracticeClaims andSocioeconomicStatus, 270 JAMA 1697 (1993); Karen H. Rothenberg,
Myth and Reality: The Threat of Medical Malpractice Claims by Low Income Women, 20 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 403 (1992).

57. See Brian McCormick, Tort Reform Victory in the House, AMA Directs Battle to
Senate, Expects Tough Fight to Uphold Damage Caps, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 21, 1995, at 1
(describing the approval by the House of Representatives of major reforms in the
professional liability tort system); Brian McCormick, States Ripe for Tort Reform: More
Coalitions, GOP Legislatures Helping the Cause, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 3, 1995, at 1
(describing similar victories within state legislatures).
58. See Mehlman, supra note 33, at 393 n. 89.
59. See E. Haavi Morreim, Economic Disclosureand Economic Advocacy: New Duties
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abuses is the so-called "gag clauses" in network physician contracts, which
purport to prohibit physicians from saying anything negative about the
managed care organization.'
Physician disclosure of conflicts of interest might remedy part of the
patient's lack of information access. But it fails as a complete solution to
the patient's predicament for the same reasons that it is unrealistic to
expect patients to be able to fend for themselves as consumers. Patients
lack the ability and the options to obtain care from non-conflicted
providers. To put it simply, what is an individual patient, particularly
one who is seriously or chronically ill, supposed to do when a physician
tells her: "By the way, your HMO wants me to deny you medical services
that might be beneficial, and is paying me a bonus in order to encourage
me to do so"? Will complaining to the managed care management do any
good? Not if reducing services is a key managed care strategy. What
about switching physicians? To whom can the patient switch when all of
the network physicians are under the same incentive plan? What about
switching plans? But this is not a viable option unless another plan is
available, is willing to accept the patient, and provides coverage of the
needed service.
Physicians are crucial patient allies. They must be encouraged as much
as possible to withstand managed care pressures on behalf of their patients.
But physician control is not the whole solution. Managed care is simply
too strong and the conflicts too great.
If physician control is not the solution, other health professionals
employed by the managed care entity, such as nurses and social workers
are unlikely to be either. Anecdotes abound about how nurses feel a
closer bond to patients than physicians. This contention might lead to the
conclusion that nurses could be entrusted with the responsibility to
represent patient interests.61
However, a nurse's employment

in the Medical Standard of Care, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 275, 328 (1991) (Explaining that
physicians are under an increasing duty "to disclose such matters as prices of services, the
conflicts of interest that limit their loyalty to the patient's interests, and economically
prompted deviations from the medical standard of care.").
60. See, e.g., Paul J. Kenkel, CincinnatiHMO Imposing "Gag Clause" in Effort to Mute
Criticisms by Physicians, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 1993, at 24 (describing an example of
a prominent Cincinnati, Ohio HMO incorporating a "gag clause" into its standard
physician contracts).
61. See, e.g., Paula Eubanks, Nurses as PatientAdvocates, 63 HOSPITALS 38 (1989)
(explaining that the board of directors of American Association of Critical Care Nurses
urges critical care nurses to serve as patient advocates and act as a liaison between a
patient, patient's family, and health care professionals).
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relationship with the provider organization poses a significant conflict of
interest.62 Moreover, if physicians do not have the power to withstand
the institution's cost-cutting efforts, neither do nurses. The same is true

of social workers.
What about the institutional ethicist or ethics committee? If protecting
patients in managed care settings is morally right, it is reasonable to
conclude that ethicists would be the prime proponents of patient concerns.
However, if ethicists are employed by providers, they face the same
conflicts as other health care professionals by virtue of their position
within the health care organization.63 For ethicists, these conflicts may
simply seem more clear and repugnant. In any event, this approach
assumes that ethicists are invariably pro-patient. Yet some of the leading
proponents of subordinating individual patient interests to community
needs are ethicists.6 4
What has been said so far about health professionals and ethicists within
health care organizations also applies to so-called "patient advocates."
These are persons employed by hospitals and other health care provider
institutions. 6 As employees of the health care institutions within which
they work, they too are unable to function effectively on behalf of
individual patients who have serious grievances with the institution.66

62. This is reflected in the Supreme Court's recognition that nurses who supervise
less skilled workers are management rather than labor for purposes of collective
bargaining. See NLRB v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778
(1994).
63. See, e.g., George Annas, Do Ethics Committees Work?, 68 HOSPS. & HEALTH
NETWORKS 6 (1994). Annas states that "ethics committees represent institutions, so they
can't be objective. They tend to side with the institution - not the patient - when there's
a dispute." Id.
64. For example, in his book, Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society,
Daniel Callahan advocates that persons beyond a certain age be denied all but comfort
care. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY
171-74 (1987).
65. Sarah Lawrence College, in Bronxville, New York, offers a Master's degree in
Health Advocacy, a program supporting a career as a Patient Representative. Mary
Cummins, PatientRepresentatives, PEDIATRICS FOR PARENTS, Sept., 1992, at 2.
66. Trubeck describes the activities of the "HMO Advocates Program" under the
Wisconsin Medicaid program as follows:
The HMO contract requires each HMO to provide an advocate position, funded by
the HMO. The advocate's role is primarily one of outreach to and education of the
enrollees. Thus far, they have targeted their efforts at disseminating information
about transportation services covered by their HMO, teaching enrollees how to use
the HlO, and encouraging the utilization of the prenatal, Healthy Start and Health
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In order to be a true proponent of patient interests, an advocate must
be able to employ all lawful means of patient protection. This means that
they can answer correctly the following four questions: (1) Who is your
boss?; (2) Is it within the scope of your employment to recommend to
patients in appropriate circumstances that they hire attorneys and sue their
physicians or hospitals?; (3) After you make such a recommendation to a
patient, do you feel comfortable informing your employer that you have
done so?; (4) After you inform your employer, does the employer say:
"Well done!"? Only if the respondent can answer the first question "the
patient," and not "the hospital" or "the managed care organization," and
then answer "yes" to the remaining three questions would she qualify as
a real advocate for patients.
The fact is, there is no such thing as a true patient advocate at this
time. No one currently in the system is capable of performing this
function without being fatally compromised by conflicts of interest. The
closest person to a real patient advocate is probably a plaintiff's
malpractice lawyer. Yet their role tends to be reactive, limited to
pursuing medical malpractice remedies. On the other hand, the goal of
a patient advocate is as much to prevent the patient from being injured by
the denial of necessary services, as to seek redress after the injury has
occurred.
So we need someone new, someone who is highly trained, motivated,
and monitored. We need a new profession.
II. THE MEDICAL ADVOCATE
If individual patients face an increasingly adversarial health care system,
yet there is no one willing or able to serve as their allies, then a new
profession of patient representatives is needed. The label ."medical
advocates" distinguishes these professionals from patient advocates in the
employ of health care providers.
Medical advocates could be trained in any one or more of a variety of
disciplines, including medicine, nursing, law, and social work. Ultimately,
they would be licensed or certified as a distinct profession, and training
would consist of special academic programs. At the outset, medical
advocates would be licensed in their respective fields of training. They
would be able to function as individuals. However, it would probably be
more efficient for them to work in teams comprised of several people with
Check programs.
Trubeck, supra note 27, at 284-85.
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different areas of specialization.
In essence, a medical advocate's job would be to make the health care
system work as well as possible for the individual patient. They would
serve as adjuncts to providers in supplying patients with the information
necessary to make informed decisions. They would help the patient
determine what benefits were provided under the patient's health plan.
If requested, they would accompany the patient to the hospital, clinic, or
physician's office; review treatment plans and related paperwork; and if
necessary, intercede on the patient's behalf to obtain the maximum
available benefits. If the patient were unable to travel, the medical
advocate would be given authority to intercede without the patient being
present. During and after episodes of care, the advocate would review
medical records to assure that complete and accurate information was
recorded, and to detect and notify the patient of any evidence of
malpractice or underservice. If disputes arose between the patient and the
patient's providers, health plan, or third-party payers, the advocate would
represent the patient's interests. The advocate would be familiar with
administrative remedies available through the federal and state
governments, including departments of health and insurance, Medicare
peer review organizations, state medical boards, the Joint Commission of
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), and the Office of
the Inspector General in the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS). If the dispute proceeded to mediation, arbitration, or litigation,
the advocate would be available to represent the patient or would
recommend an attorney.
The role of the medical advocate would be tailored to the needs of
individual patients. Some patients would require little more than
Others would need informal or formal
information or advice.
intervention by the advocate. Advocates would acquaint the patient with
the range of services offered and allow the patient to decide how
extensively he or she wished to take advantage of them.
Medical advocates could be paid in various ways, depending on the type
of clients they have. Either an hourly rate or a fixed rate for specific
services would be appropriate.' It is important that the advocates have
no financial ties to any entity that would create a conflict of interest
If advocates formed an
between them and their patient-clients.
organization, it should be not-for-profit to distinguish it from for-profit
67. The advocate might be salaried by a medical advocate organization. However,
care would have to be taken to prevent the organization from pressuring advocates to take
on more lucrative clients or to avoid those who were likely to consume extensive time and
energy.
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providers and insurers, and to enhance patient trust.
Wealthier patients would be able to pay advocates out of their own
pockets, much as they do attorneys. Medical advocates could also accept
part of malpractice awards or judgments for breach of fiduciary duties or
bad faith breach of contract as payment. Organizations of dues-paying
members could be formed to help finance medical advocates for the
middle class, akin to the American Automobile Association (AAA).6
The government could concentrate on subsidizing medical advocates for
the poor, which would be less expensive than providing ombudspersons
for everyone, as suggested in connection with national health reform.
Government funds might be raised by a small tax on managed care
organizations.69
Medical advocate firms could reduce their costs by using physicians,
attorneys, and other high-priced individuals on a supervisory and
consulting basis and relying on somewhat lower-paid professional
personnel such as nurses, social workers, and paralegals to do most of the
work. In addition, medical advocate firms could establish computerized
networks and clearinghouses to exchange information and to consult on
difficult or common problems.
Precursors to medical advocates already exist. Persons trained as nurses
and medical information specialists are setting up businesses to help
patients obtain information about their condition and available treatment
options.7 ° Companies have been formed which, for a fee or percentage,
assist patients in filing insurance claims with private and public third-party

68. While this organization acts as a lobbyist for motorists, it also provides
important services to individuals, such as emergency road assistance, maps, trip planning,
and insurance. A dues-paying patient organization could provide a set of basic advocacy
services to its members. In the same way that the AAA furnishes additional services to
members for a fee, such as information about new car prices, the patient organization
could provide more labor-intensive services to individuals willing to pay extra. See supra
note 27 and accompanying text.
69. Medical advocate funding for poor patients is important in that without it, those
patients who can afford medical advocates may deplete medical allocations that would
otherwise be available for the poor. This is less likely to be a problem if health care plans
for the poor remain distinct and are funded separately from those for higher income
individuals and families.
70. See Steve Fishman, ThePowerfulPatient:ResearchingYour Own Illness Is Not That
Hard - If You Know Where to Look, Who to Call, and What to Ask for, HEALTH,
Mar./Apr., 1993, at 74, 77-78 (listing various organizations and data brokers who provide
information on various diseases and disabilities); Francesca L. Kritz & Janet Novack,
Patient,Educate Thyself, FORBES, Sept., 1992, at 504-05 (describing medical information
sources).
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payer programs.7 1 Some patients hire private case managers to help them
deal with providers and payers. 72 Lawyers often perform many of the
functions of medical advocates. But there is no profession that combines
all of these functions. We need one, and we need it now.
Il.

CONCLUSION

From the viewpoint of an individual patient, the vision of the emerging
health care system is not a pretty picture. This is particularly true for
patients who are seriously or chronically ill and who require substantial
health care resources. As health care delivery is transformed from a
professional calling into a business employing professionals, patients must
recognize that the process of obtaining health care services is becoming an
arms-length transaction. Patients must be prepared to represent their own
interests, and they will need professional help to do so.
Two cautions must be sounded. First, medical advocates are not a
complete solution to the plight of managed care patients. Patient interests
must be protected by the entire range of approaches described in Part II,
including legislative reforms, ombudspersons, greater patient information,
self-reliance, and aggressive pursuit of legal remedies by attorneys when
appropriate. Medical advocates must be added to this arsenal, not replace
it.
Second, creating a new profession to protect patients does not mean
abandoning the old ones. The patient's chief allies will continue to be
physicians, nurses, and other traditional health care professionals. It
would be a grave misunderstanding of this article's message to assume that,
although employees of managed care organizations cannot be one hundred
percent on the patient's side, they are not on the patient's side at all. The
interests of these people are not opposedto those of patients; rather, health
care professionals have a conflict of interest. While they are pulled in the
direction of allegiance to the health care organization, their professional
ethic and moral code often align them with the patient. Medical advocates
must devise ways to promote the patient-oriented ethos of health care
professionals. It remains their strongest weapon.

71. See Melynda Dorel Wilcox, Buried in Medical Paperwork?Here are Some Better
Ways to Stay on Top ofIt, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., Nov., 1993, at 101-02 (describing
professional help for filing medical claims).
72. See Charles Schaeffer et al., Help With Home Care, CHANGING TIMES, Aug., 1989,
at 75 (describing how to hire a private case manager).

